Episode 11 – (At last they ask) What is Law?

Any competent lawyer should be able to say what is the law on a given topic in their area of expertise.  However, most lawyers find it surprisingly difficult to answer persuasively the general question “what is law?”.

In this episode we grapple with some debates that go back centuries.  We look at the positivist approach: that law is simply whatever is laid down constitutionally (ie “posited”). You might think this is self-evident.  It’s also convenient, because “law” is kept neatly separate from “morality” and “politics”.

However, there has been a strong body of thought around ideas of “natural law” and “natural rights” which maintains that a “law” which violates nature is not actually law.  Today, some human rights theorists take this view too.

Any competent lawyer should be able to tell you what is “the” law on a topic if it’s in their area of expertise.  But most lawyers struggle to answer the general question “What is Law?”

It’s an important question because law pervades our lives. 

The English legal theorist William Twining used to ask his first year law students to open a newspaper and highlight stories that related to the law.  Today, with online and social media, the result would be the same as then: students would have difficulty deciding what to leave out. 

The law mandates, facilitates, prohibits, protects, regulates or sanctions all aspects of our lives. So, asking what makes law ‘law-like’ is one way we can understand how our society ticks.

Stephen Bottomley

If there is anyone out there who has listened to every episode, they will know we have chipped away at the question “What is Law?” 

We’ve discussed the Rule of Law. We’ve looked at where law comes from. And we have asked why people obey it. 

We’ve also had two episodes with Justice in the title; surely these must be relevant to this topic as well?

Yes, maybe. Like many complex issues, it’s helpful to make some basic distinctions.  Here we start with the difference between what philosophers call positivism and natural law.

Positivism comes from the verb “to posit”, or to lay down. 

So a positivist says that law is whatever comes out of the correct procedure for making law, and the correct procedure is found in a country’s constitution. 

You may not like a particular law, you may think it is unjust or immoral, but nevertheless, assuming it has been made constitutionally, it is a law until changed. And the sum total of laws is “the Law”, with a capital L.

This is attractive to many people.  It keeps things in their place.  It also keeps Law separate from questions of morality. 

Yes, you may critique laws from a moral perspective; but the law is not intrinsically moral or immoral. 

You may pass laws because of your moral beliefs, but they are still separate things. 

You may argue that some laws should not, or need not, be obeyed, because of your morality, but you don’t have to doubt their validity as laws.

However, many positivists wilt under a little pressure. 

Suppose a democratically elected parliament starts making retrospective laws and violates what we think of as primary requirements of the Rule of Law. 

If you start to stay that a new Act of Parliament isn’t law because it violates Rule of Law principles, you are letting a political philosophy in. You are saying that ideas such as fairness or equality are necessary parts of law.

But it’s the alternative tradition of natural law theory which takes the challenge to positivism head-on. 

In large part, natural law has religious origins, particularly in the form of natural rights.

A key figure in the history of the idea, St Augustine, in about the year 400 is said to have announced that “unjust law is not law”, which sums up that position.  It is only law if it passes some non-law test, such as religion or morality.

This contrasts with the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, a strident positivist, who argued in 1796 that natural rights were just nonsense upon stilts.

These days a belief in fundamental “human rights” might have the same function,  to the extent that some say a positive law which violates them does not have the force of law; which is a natural law position. 

You don’t have to be religious, to see some merit in natural law theory. 

What the Nazis did in the 1930s and 1940s were not at the time all crimes under international law, but prosecutions after the Second World War relied on the existence of ‘crimes against humanity’ that had simply not then been recognised before in positive law.  If it was a crime even though there was no positive law, it must have come from some natural law.  

As if things aren’t complicated enough, you could say there is a third “tradition”, which we would call a critical one. 

Suppose language is always vague to some extent.  Suppose there are usually different ways of manipulating language to get to different outcomes. 

In other words, if law is “indeterminate”, as the expression goes, then the judge must be drawing on something else to make their decision. 

You might say it is their politics, or it is their morality, but it isn’t “law” because in this tradition “law” can’t supply all its own answers.

In the first half of the 20th Century, some legal scholars called themselves Legal Realists, and took this position. 

By the end of the 20th century, influenced by feminist and critical race theories, a more strident version of it emerged as Critical Legal Studies.

A more benign version is in the work of Ronald Dworkin, who pointed out that law is more than just rules.  It also contains principles which guide an answer but don’t determine it. 

A judge has to interpret and apply these principles, and in this way morality becomes a part of law and not just an external perspective.

And at some stage in this series we’ll have to talk about Law and Economics.  One version of this claims that law is really just efficiency in action. 

Perhaps there is no universal definition “out there”.  No single essence of Law. Perhaps people understand law differently, depending on their circumstances and their experience with the legal system.  

And the question becomes even more complicated when different systems of law come together, for example, when we think about the laws of First Nations people, We’ll look at First Nations legal issues in future episodes.

And does it matter if we cannot reach a universal answer to our question, what is law? 

Oh great.  Another school of thought.  The Invisible Theory of Law.

Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Belknap Press, 1986

John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd edition, Clarendon Press, 2011

HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, 1961

William Twining and David Miers, How To Do Things With Rules, 5th edition, Cambridge University Press, 2012

Richard Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law, 9th edition, Aspen Publishing, 2014

Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, Verso, 2015

Leave a Comment